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The hedonic principle—the desire to approach pleasure and avoid pain—is frequently
presumed to be the fundamental principle upon which motivation is built. In the past
few decades, researchers have enriched our understanding of how approaching pleasure
and avoiding pain differ from each other. However, more recent empirical and theoretical
work delineating the principles of motivation in humans and non-human animals has shown
that not only can approach/avoidance motivations themselves be further distinguished into
promotion approach/avoidance and prevention approach/avoidance, but that approaching
pleasure and avoiding pain requires the functioning of additional distinct motivations—the
motivation to establish what is real (truth) and the motivation to manage what happens
(control). Considering these additional motivations in the context of moral psychology and
animal welfare science suggests that these less-examined motives may themselves be
fundamental to a comprehensive understanding of motivation, with major implications
for the study of the “what,” “how,” and “why” of human and non-human approach and
avoidance behavior.
Keywords: motivation, approach, avoidance, promotion, prevention, truth, control, value
INTRODUCTION
The hedonic principle has existed for at least as long as we
have had the capacity to write down our thoughts about our-
selves, being recorded, for example, in the teachings of the
ancient Greek philosopher Epicurus. In modern times, the prin-
ciple reached its fullest expression as a foundation for human
psychology and ethics in Bentham’s (1789/2007) inﬂuential An
Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation: “Nature
has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign mas-
ters, pain, and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what
we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do”
(Bentham, 1789/2007). The principle that humans and other
animals approach desired end-states and avoid undesired end-
states has served as the foundation for important theories across
disciplines from political theory (Neumann and Morgenstern,
1944/2007) to behavioral economics (Simon, 1955). In many
ways, our common economic life is built around this basic idea
(Smith, 1776/2003), and it is one of the primary assumptions of
many theories of animal behavior, both human and non-human
(Thorndike, 1911, 1935). The fact that human beings and other
animals approach pleasure and avoid pain has been treated as
the fundamental principle from which all other examinations of
motivation must ﬂow (Watson, 1913; Freud, 1920/1950; Skinner,
1938).
The ascendance of approach and avoidance in the
psychology literature co-occurred with the rise of behaviorism
(Thorndike, 1911; Watson, 1913; Skinner, 1938, 1953). Behavior-
ist theorists, as a rule, argued that one cannot scientiﬁcally reason
beyond those actions which can be directly observed and the con-
tingencies that surround those actions—namely reinforcements
and punishments (Thorndike, 1911). Any speculation as to the
internal workings of those motivations, whether cognitive or oth-
erwise, was eschewed as unscientiﬁc (Watson, 1913). The hard
scientiﬁc work of a number of psychologists led to a cognitive
revolution in the middle of the 20th century overthrowing behav-
iorist assumptions (e.g., White, 1959; Bandura, 1977), yet the
premise regarding approach and avoidance as the fundamental
distinction in motivation has remained (for a review, see Higgins,
1997).
Beginning in the late 20th century, many scientiﬁc discoveries
were made further distinguishing between approaching positive
end-states vs. avoiding negative end-states (Carver and Sheier,
1998; Carver, 2004), and extended this distinction into many
additional areas of research. For example, Goal Orientation The-
ory has made signiﬁcant contributions to our understanding of
achievement motivation (Dweck, 1986; Pintrich, 2000; Elliot,
2005). Although future explorations of truth and control motives
may discover interesting relations to achievement motivation, our
model of motivation is theoretically orthogonal to these lines of
research. For this reason, their possible interrelationships will
not be discussed in detail here. For the purposes of this review,
we focus on the contributions that have culminated in promi-
nent theoretical advances in other ﬁelds dealing with motivation,
including moral psychology (e.g., Janoff-Bulman et al., 2009) and
animal welfare science (e.g., Fraser and Duncan, 1998). In this
paper, we argue that, in part due to its resounding success as a
theoretical framework for behavior, the approach/avoidance dis-
tinction is now at risk of becoming a “one size ﬁts all” principle.
Speciﬁcally, multiple kinds of motivations are now treated as if
they entailed a simple approach/avoidance hedonic distinction
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when, in fact, not only are they not simply hedonic, they are
also distinct from one another in important ways. We pro-
pose that these distinctions matter to future research in many
ﬁelds of study and that attending to them may yield important
breakthroughs.
In this paper, though we argue that this treatment of
approach/avoidance as a “one size ﬁts all” principle of motiva-
tion is difﬁcult to sustain in light of recent research, we fully
recognize the importance of this distinction for motivation sci-
ence. We thus begin the paper by outlining the ways in which
the approach/avoidance distinction has made signiﬁcant con-
tributions to two areas of study: non-human animal behavior
and moral psychology. We then review recent work in these
ﬁelds demonstrating that other motivational distinctions need
to be taken into account as well, and argue that some of these
motives may in fact be fundamental to fully understanding the
approach/avoidance distinction itself—looking within the “one
size ﬁts all” approach/avoidance principle to delineate the “what,”
“how,” and “why” of these orientations and behaviors.
ADVANCES IN APPROACH AND AVOIDANCE MOTIVATION
RESEARCH
The hedonic principle has provided psychologists with consider-
able predictive power since the foundational days of psychology in
the 19th century. This includes research on non-human animals—
driven by an understanding that some (though not all, see Higgins
and Pittman, 2008) of the major components of human nature are
shared with non-human animals through the branching process
of evolution (Watson, 1913; Skinner, 1938, 1953)—and the search
for essential components of human nature around which we can
organize an ethics to guide our common life (Mill, 1863/2007; for
a recent review, see Kitcher, 2011). Interestingly, though assump-
tions about approach and avoidance have underpinned the study
of animal behavior and morality for over 100 years, some particu-
lar advances in eachﬁeld have only been achievedbydistinguishing
between approach and avoidance in recent decades.
APPROACH/AVOIDANCE IN NON-HUMAN ANIMALS
Formany, the appeal of the study of non-human animals lies in the
ability of this line of inquiry to reveal fundamental truths about
nature. Evolutionary theory in particular has shownus that human
beings constitute only one species of animal, and that we are, at
our most basic, mammals subject to many similar kinds of moti-
vations as other animals. Approach and avoidance motivations
have played a substantial part in understanding non-human ani-
mal behavior. For example, approach and avoidance orientations
have been tied to underlying individual differences between ani-
mals. Certain animals, more than others, are willing to take risks
in order to achieve their goals, while other animals, more than
others, are consistently more risk-averse in their behavior (Wilson
et al., 1994). Animals that fall into the former category have been
classiﬁed as “bold,” whereas those that fall into the latter category
have been classiﬁed as “shy.” These individual differences map
onto a greater reliance on approach and avoidance orientations,
respectively.
The bold/shy continuum has received an enormous amount
of attention in recent years. Researchers have found individual
differences on this continuum with attendant behavioral impli-
cations in squid (Sinn et al., 2008), ﬁsh (Toms et al., 2010), and
lizards (López et al., 2005), just to name a few. Their underlying
neurological differences have been studied (Reddon and Hurd,
2009), the impact of environmental context in their variation has
been researched (Wilson et al., 1993), and the evolutionary ori-
gins of these individual differences have been explored (Wilson
et al., 1994). Differences along this continuum have been linked to
fundamental differences in stress responses (Oswald et al., 2012)
and learning (Sneddon, 2003). It is clear that examining the
difference in approach and avoidance inclinations, here under-
stood as having either a bold or shy personality, has proven a
to be a productive theoretical foundation for scientiﬁc explo-
ration of non-human animals. However, as we will describe
in more detail later, there are animal behaviors that cannot be
understood from just a “one size ﬁts all” approach/avoidance
perspective. A more complete picture of non-human animal
motivation requires the consideration of additional motivational
distinctions.
APPROACH/AVOIDANCE IN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY
Approach and avoidance motivations are fundamental in another
way as well. They can help us to understand one of the most basic
principles around which human societies organize themselves:
ethics or morality. The principles of approach and avoidance have
been integral to the study of ethics since the empiricists of the
Scottish Enlightenment designated morality as an instrumental
means for bringing about general happiness. For example, Hume
(1751/1998), following Hutchinson (1725/2005), argued for the
importance of positive and negative sentiments in morality, par-
ticularly in moral motivation. Mill (1863/2007) went so far as to
argue that pleasure andpainprovided a frameworkboth for under-
standing and predicting human behavior and also for building a
system of ethical dos and don’ts: things to approach and things to
avoid.
Over the years, however, the predictive power of this hedonic
approach has been called into question, perhapsmost prominently
byKahneman andTversky (1979),whosework revealed important
differences between what happens psychologically when peo-
ple approach positive outcomes vs. avoid negative outcomes.
In Prospect Theory, they argued that the motive to avoid pain
“looms larger” than the motive to attain pleasure, and, impor-
tantly, people are relatively risk-seeking when avoiding negative
outcomes (in the domain of losses) but are relatively risk-averse
when approaching positive outcomes (in the domain of gains). In
a manner similar to Prospect Theory’s revisions of the nature of
approach vs. avoidance in decision making, Janoff-Bulman et al.
(2009) have shown that the two are different with respect to ethical
systems. One system, the proscriptive system, motivates behav-
ioral inhibition—avoiding moral wrongs. The other system, the
prescriptive system, motivates behavioral activation—approaching
moral rights. Their research has shown that approach and avoid-
ance are not merely inverted images of one another, but that each
has unique goals and tendencies and characteristics associatedwith
it (including differences in political ideology; see Janoff-Bulman
et al., 2008). Researchers using this paradigm have theorized
important differences between the two systems that could have
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importance for research on ethics generally (Janoff-Bulman and
Carnes, 2013).
These theories are important because they can aid in further
understanding the nature of decision making and behavior in
human society. However, there are additional motivational dis-
tinctions that need to be considered in order to have a more
complete picture of ethics, and, as we will see, to understand ani-
mal behavior as well. In the next section, we distinguish between
two distinct motivational systems around which approach and
avoidance motivations are organized, and show how they have
made important contributions to the areas of animal welfare
research and moral psychology.
PROMOTION AND PREVENTION VALUE MOTIVES: THE
“WHY” OF APPROACH AND AVOIDANCE
Over the past two decades, research on approach and avoid-
ance has been qualiﬁed by research on regulatory focus theory
(Higgins, 1997, 1998). According to regulatory focus theory,
the valued goals of approaching desired end-states and avoid-
ing undesired end-states are organized into two independent
and distinct motivational systems (Molden et al., 2008; Higgins,
2014). The promotion system approaches end-states related to
nurturance, advancement, and growth while avoiding depriva-
tion or stagnation—the motivation is to advance from the status
quo “0” to a better state “+1.” Success or pleasure in pro-
motion is attaining a “+1” (gain) and failure or pain is not
attaining a “+1” (non-gain). The prevention system approaches
end-states related to security and safety while avoiding danger or
threat—the motivation is to maintain a satisfactory status quo
“0” against a worse state “−1.” Success or pleasure in preven-
tion is maintaining “0” (a non-loss) and failure or pain is not
maintaining “0” (a loss). A visual representation of these systems
with respect to the approach and avoidance systems is available in
Figure 1.
We should note a few other relevant distinctions within regu-
latory focus theory (for a fuller account, see Scholer and Higgins,
2008). Both when approaching desired end-states and avoiding
undesired end-states, humans and non-human animals can pur-
sue their goal with either an eager strategy of seeking opportunities
to make progress or a vigilant strategy of being careful and avoid-
ing mistakes. Whether approaching desired end-states or avoiding
undesired end-states, the preferred strategy (i.e., what ﬁts) for
those with a promotion focus is an eager strategy whereas the
FIGURE 1 | Promotion and prevention goals within the approach and
avoidance systems.
preferred strategy for those with a prevention focus is a vigilant
strategy (Higgins, 2000). But, notably, the non-preferred strategy
(i.e., a non-ﬁt) will also be used, sometimes because it is dic-
tated by the situation (e.g., instructions about what strategy to
use, like a team leader telling other team members to“be careful”).
Finally, it should also be noted that either taking action (behavioral
approach) or inhibiting action (behavioral avoidance) can occur
in the service of strategic eagerness or in the service of strategic
vigilance. For example, as we will see below, an animal concerned
about safety (prevention) might be careful (vigilant strategy) to
approach something new in the cage (behavioral approach) in
order to make sure that it is safe, or approach a noxious object in
the cage in order to bury it (behavioral approach).
The literature has seen a proliferation of research based on
this model showing that the promotion and prevention distinc-
tion has signiﬁcant explanatory power independent of the hedonic
approach and avoidance motivations (Higgins et al., 1997, 2003;
Förster et al., 1998,2001;Malaviya andBrendl,2014). This research
has covered a variety of domains from persuasion (Cesario et al.,
2004), to negotiation (Appelt et al., 2009), to consumer choice
(Higgins, 2002), to interpersonal relationships (Molden et al.,
2009). Theoretically, it has inspired more comprehensive models
of the approach and avoidance motives, understanding them as
being further subdivided into promotion goals (including “ideal”
hopes and aspirations) on the one hand and prevention goals
(including “ought” duties and obligations) on the other (Crowe
and Higgins, 1997; Higgins, 1997). Recently, there is even evidence
in neuroscience that the two kinds of distinctions—promotion
vs. prevention in contrast to approach vs. avoidance—are asso-
ciated with independent patterns of brain activation (Eddington
et al., 2007; Strauman and Wilson, 2010). In this section, we will
be focusing on new research applied to the ﬁelds of animal wel-
fare science and moral psychology to highlight the fundamental
character of the promotion vs. prevention distinction.
PROMOTION/PREVENTION IN NON-HUMAN ANIMALS
The promotion vs. prevention distinction is well-established
in humans, but recent research supports their existence in
non-human animals as well. For example, one set of studies
examined individual differences in behaviors reﬂecting promo-
tion and prevention motivations among a group of zoo-housed
cotton-top tamarins (Franks et al., 2013b). Through extensive
observation, researchers identiﬁed individuals who consistently
prioritized gains over safety (time spent eating in the open)
or safety over gains (time spent hiding) in order to classify
them as more promotion-focused or prevention-focused, respec-
tively. Importantly, an approach/avoidance model of behavior
(using the bold/shy conceptualization mentioned above) could
similarly classify the above individuals as being more approach-
oriented (“bold”) or avoidance-oriented (“shy”), respectively.
Thus, it is unclear whether the monkeys appearing to priori-
tize safety are avoiding danger—which would be more in line
with an avoidance-motivated model of behavior—or approaching
security—which would be more in line with a prevention-
motivated model of behavior. Similarly, it is unclear whether the
monkeys appearing to prioritize gains are approaching indiscrimi-
nately—which would be more in line with an approach-motivated
Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org October 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 194 | 3
Cornwell et al. Truth, control, and value motivations
model of behavior—or are motivated by gains speciﬁcally—which
would be more in line with a promotion-motivated model of
behavior.
In order to test which model—approach/avoidance vs.
promotion/prevention—made a better account of the ani-
mals’ behavior, researchers placed two different kinds of novel
enrichment items into the monkey’s housing: one a “gain”
enrichment and the other a “non-gain” enrichment (Franks
et al., 2013b). If the primary difference separating the indi-
viduals described above was an approach/avoidance difference,
then those classiﬁed as “approach”-oriented should approach
all the novel objects more quickly than those classiﬁed as
“avoidance”-oriented since coming into the open to examine
a novel stimulus carries risk and should be unconditionally
more aversive to the “avoidance”-oriented individuals than the
“approach”-oriented individuals. However, if instead the two
types of monkeys were actually different according to the pro-
motion/prevention distinction, then this dynamic should only
be conditionally true in the case of the “gain” object. In the
case of the “non-gain” object, a regulatory focus model of
behavior suggests that a promotion-focused individual should
be uninterested because it has no gain potential, while the
prevention-focused individual should be interested in cautiously
examining the object in order to establish its status as a non-
threat. The results conﬁrmed the regulatory focus distinction,
with prevention-focused monkey approaching a novel “non-
gain” object faster than promotion-focused monkey (Franks et al.,
2013b).
Research with rats has also shown that there are individual
differences with respect to preferences for promotion vs. pre-
vention goals. In one study, these goals were operationalized
as time spent near a location containing food reward (promo-
tion) vs. time spent near a location that turned the overhead
light off, which, because they are nocturnal, creates security
for rats (prevention; Franks et al., 2012). Though the promo-
tion or prevention behavior of individual rats was stable in
this test over several weeks, once again, from these behaviors
alone it is unclear whether the observed differences are due to
an approach/avoidance distinction or a promotion/prevention
distinction. Were the darkness-preferring rats avoiding light as
aversive or approaching darkness to maintain security? Were the
treat-preferring rats approaching indiscriminately or approaching
gains speciﬁcally?
To test these alternative hypotheses, the rats were observed in a
different apparatus into which a noxious stimulus was introduced
(Franks et al., 2012). If the rats preferring darkness were driven
primarily by an avoidance orientation, then we would expect them
to move as far away from the noxious stimulus as possible. If,
however, the rats preferring darkness were driven by a prevention
orientation, then we would expect them to approach the noxious
stimulus in order to bury it, which is a rat’s natural defensive
behavior and means by which to restore safety (Pinel and Treit,
1978). The results favored the latter hypothesis: time with the
noxious stimulus to bury it (vigilant behavioral approach in the
service of prevention) was predicted by time spent maintaining
darkness (prevention) and not by time spent with food reward
(promotion). This animal behavior research is in line with recent
work in humans examining how a prevention focus can actually
motivate riskier behavior (i.e., more approach-oriented behavior)
when under conditions of loss or threat (Scholer et al., 2010).
Finally, another set of studies with a separate group of rats
further distinguished promotion and prevention motivation from
simple approach/avoidance motivation (Franks et al., 2014). Rats
were again placed in an environment in which they could focus
on maximizing gains (obtaining treats) and on maintaining safety
(keeping the room dark) and again stable individual differences
in promotion and prevention motivation were observed. In this
experiment, however, researchers were able to collect a measure of
chronic stress (or poor welfare) and found it to be inversely related
to both promotion and prevention. This ﬁnding parallels empir-
ical work in humans (Grant and Higgins, 2003) and corresponds
to regulatory focus theory, which predicts positive emotions and
well-being resulting from being effective at both promotion and
prevention goals (Higgins, 1997). This ﬁndingwould be somewhat
puzzling from a simple approach/avoidance model of motivation
and welfare, however, because if avoidance was driving the pre-
vention animals’ behavior, they should be more fearful than other
animals and thus have lower welfare.
In sum, the behavior in non-human animals suggests a dis-
tinction between promotion goals and prevention goals within
the approach and avoidance systems. Indeed, given its presence
among non-human animals, even those as evolutionarily distant
from humans as rats, this regulatory focus distinction—the “why”
of approach and avoidance—may turn out to be a fundamental
characteristic within the approach/avoidance distinction. This dis-
tinction is not limited to non-human animal welfare, however. As
we discuss next, the role of promotion and prevention in moral
psychology has been theoretically and empirically demonstrated
as well.
PROMOTION/PREVENTION IN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY
Over the past several years, there has been a push to examine
the approach and avoidance distinction within moral psychology.
However, until very recently, the independent role of promo-
tion goals and prevention goals in the area of ethics has been
largely unexplored. As with the non-human animal research out-
lined above, goals to approach moral behavior can be understood
as stemming from either ideals or oughts, and efforts taken to
avoid immoral behavior can similarly be understood as avoiding
discrepancies with these distinct kinds of goals.
The ﬁrstmajor exploration of promotion and preventionmoti-
vations in morality was carried out by Camacho et al. (2003). In
a series of studies, these researchers found that different strategic
framing of moral errors (“sins”) created more intense feelings of
regret depending on whether a person had a strong promotion or
prevention focus. For example, those whose sins involved an error
of commission (not being vigilant enough to avoid doing some-
thing bad) experienced more regret when they had a stronger
prevention focus, whereas those whose sins involved an error
of omission (not being eager enough to do something good)
experienced more regret when they had a stronger promotion
focus.
Like the animal behavior studies above, it would be possi-
ble to make similar predictions as those above relying only on
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the approach/avoidance distinction, instead stating that those
who experience their errors of commission as more wrong are
more motivated by avoidance inclinations and those who experi-
ence their errors of omission as more wrong are more motivated
by approach inclinations. Are those with stronger promotion
goals simply more concerned about approaching moral rights?
Similarly, are those with stronger prevention goals simply more
concerned about avoiding moral wrongs?
Other results from the Camacho et al. (2003) research pro-
vide evidence that the regulatory focus distinction matters for
ethical responses beyond simple approach/avoidance. If the
effects were due entirely to concern with approaching moral
rights or avoiding moral wrongs, then the speciﬁc content
of those rights and wrongs would not matter. However, they
did matter signiﬁcantly. Consistent with the regulatory focus
perspective, those with a strong prevention focus experienced
failures of social responsibility (a prevention security concern)
as more wrong than those with a weak prevention focus (and
those with strong promotion focus), whereas those with a
strong promotion focus experienced failures to support oth-
ers (a promotion nurturance concern) as more wrong than
those with a weak promotion focus (and those with a strong
prevention focus). Importantly, this effect was independent of
whether the wrong was framed as an act of commission or
omission.
In another study by Camacho et al. (2003), promotion
and prevention had important effects with respect to positive
moral evaluations as well. In this case, the difference between
approach/avoidance on the one hand and regulatory focus on the
other was made even more apparent. This study related partic-
ipants’ judgments of the perceived appropriateness of a conﬂict
resolution strategy that was taken by his or her parent or guardian
(“We ask that you think back to a time when you had a con-
ﬂict with your parent or guardian and he/she resolved the conﬂict
by. . ..”). The strategic ﬁt with promotion or prevention was
independent of whether the strategy involved an attempt by the
parent or guardian to increase future good behaviors (approach)
or to decrease future bad behaviors (avoidance). The strategy
could either be eager/positive (e.g., encouragement to succeed,
providing opportunity), eager/negative (e.g., taking away a priv-
ilege, acting disappointed), vigilant/positive (e.g., safeguarding
against undesired behaviors, alerting to potential dangers), and
vigilant/negative (e.g., raising his/her voice, providing criticism).
If it were the case that the omission/commission difference
associated with promotion/prevention was actually an effect of
approach/avoidance, then those with a stronger promotion focus
should see the positive approach resolutions as more appropriate
than the negative avoidance resolutions, and those with a stronger
prevention focus should see the negative avoidance resolutions as
more appropriate than the positive approach resolutions. This pat-
ternwas not found. Instead, the researchers found that thosewith a
stronger promotion focus preferred the eager resolutions over the
vigilant resolutions regardless of whether the resolutions involved
positive approach or negative avoidance. Similarly, those with a
stronger prevention focus preferred the vigilant resolution over
the eager resolution, regardless of whether the resolution involved
positive approach or negative avoidance (Camacho et al., 2003).
Not only does this empirical evidence support the importance
of the distinction between promotion and prevention indepen-
dent of approach/avoidance in the area of ethics, more recent
research indicates that recognizing this difference can help us
to better understand some of the more well-known conun-
drums within moral psychology. For example, research on the
promotion and prevention systems has shown that those pro-
cessing in a promotion focus tend to make judgments and
decisions based on feelings, while those processing in a pre-
vention system tend to make judgments and decisions based
on reasons (Pham and Avnet, 2004; Avnet and Higgins, 2006).
The divide between feelings and reasons is analogous to the
well-known division within moral psychology between social-
intuitionists on the one hand who understand moral judg-
ments and decisions as primarily arising from intuitions or
affect (Haidt, 2001), and cognitive-developmental theorists on
the other who approach morality as a fundamentally cogni-
tive enterprise (Kohlberg, 1969). An intriguing possibility is
that they may both be correct: processing moral goals in a
promotion manner may rely on intuitions/affect, while process-
ing moral goals in a prevention manner may rely on cogni-
tion/reasons.
So far the evidence has supported this hypothesis. Consider,
for example, the infamous “incest” scenario put forward by
social-intuitionists as a prototypical scenario evoking a nega-
tive intuitive response but a more muted deliberative response
(Haidt et al., 1993). In this scenario, a brother and sister sleep
together once, but not before taking precautions to avoid any
negative consequences of the act (i.e., using two forms of con-
traception, agreeing to keep it a secret). Recent research has
found that those who process this scenario in a promotion
focus see the incest as more wrong than those who process
it in a prevention focus (Cornwell and Higgins, unpublished
manuscript). Importantly, in another study, Cornwell and Higgins
(unpublished manuscript) examined the promotion/prevention
distinction independent of the approach/avoidance distinction.
In this study, participants were experimentally divided into
four groups: promotion/approach, promotion/avoidance, pre-
vention/approach, and prevention/avoidance. This study repli-
cated the “stronger moral condemnation for promotion than
prevention” effect for the incest scenario while also demon-
strating the effect for another scenario (the equally infamous
“dog-eating family” scenario, see Haidt et al., 1993) but, impor-
tantly, showed no effect of the approach vs. avoidance dis-
tinction (Cornwell and Higgins, unpublished manuscript). This
research provides another example of how understanding dis-
tinct types of avoidance motives—the promotion version and
the prevention version—can contribute to a better understand-
ing of how moral judgments can have very different motivational
underpinnings.
Another area in which the distinction between the promotion
and prevention systems has proved relevant in ethics is in the
examination of multiple moral actions across time. Much research
has been devoted to understanding how different ways of framing
moral goals can inﬂuence people to behave in either consistently
good ways or to switch from good to bad (e.g., engaging in bad
behavior because prior good behavior has “licensed” you to do
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so; Sachdeva et al., 2009). For example, in one study, when par-
ticipants purchased “green” environmentally friendly products,
compared to those who purchased conventional products, they
later behaved less altruistically and were more likely to cheat and
steal on subsequent tasks (Mazar and Zhong, 2010). These latter
immoral behaviors (i.e., cheating and stealing) were understood as
“licensed” by prior moral behaviors (i.e., the purchase of a “green”
product). However, in spite of research showing this effect, there
are conditions in which behaving morally can actually lead to
moral consistency rather than moral licensing (Conway and Peetz,
2012), and thus many questions surrounding these phenomena
remain (Merritt et al., 2010). The promotion/prevention distinc-
tion provides some insight into the motivational underpinnings
of these effects.
As noted above, research has shown that when people process
decisions within the prevention system, they tend to use vigilant
means to pursue stability and security, which leads them to favor
the status quo options over alternatives (Chernev, 2004). One
example of the prevention focus leading to a tendency toward
preserving the status quo is the research ﬁnding that the endow-
ment effect is stronger for individuals with a prevention focus
than a promotion focus (Liberman et al., 1999). Another exam-
ple is the propensity of prevention-focused individuals (but not
promotion-focused individuals) to repeat in the present ways of
doing things that they experienced in the past. Studies have shown
that prevention-focused managers manage others with the style
that they received when they were managed in the past, and that
they preserve this status quo even when they disliked receiving this
style of management (Zhang et al., 2011). The extension to moral
psychology would predict that, compared to those who are more
promotion-focused and those with a weak prevention focus, those
with a strong prevention focus should be more likely to behave in
a consistent manner, regardless of whether their original behavior
was moral or immoral.
This prediction was supported in recent research. Participants
with a strong prevention focus (whether measured chronically
or experimentally induced) were more likely to repeat past
good behaviors or repeat past bad behaviors compared to those
who were either low in chronic prevention or induced into
a promotion focus (Zhang et al., 2014). Importantly for the
purposes of this paper, these effects occurred whether or not
the initial moral behavior involved doing something bad, that
is, an immoral act that ought to be avoided, such as cheat-
ing, or involved failing to do something good, that is, a moral
act that ought to be approached, such as pledging money to
a charity. This research thus provides a further demonstra-
tion of the importance of the promotion/prevention distinc-
tion within approach and within avoidance in the domain of
ethics.
In sum, we see that the promotion/prevention distinction
provides us with a more comprehensive view of the “why” of
approach and avoidance. That is, when considering approach and
avoidance as “why” we are motivated to do things, it is neces-
sary to go beyond this simple distinction to recognize that there
are two fundamentally different value systems within approach
and within avoidance. Approaching desired end-states and avoid-
ing undesired end-states in a promotion focus is fundamentally
different from approaching desired end-states and avoiding unde-
sired end-states in a prevention focus. Therefore, to understand
how the approach value system works it is necessary to know how
it works in promotion and how it works in prevention. Similarly,
to understand how the avoidance value system works it is nec-
essary to know how it works in promotion and how it works in
prevention.
But what of the other two questions we seek to answer: the
“what” and the “how” of approach/avoidance motivation? In the
next section, we provide an overview of the importance of these
two questions for understanding approach and avoidance behav-
iors and provide evidence that they are as important to understand
as value (promotion and prevention) and cannot be understood
in terms of the approach/avoidance distinction alone.
TRUTH AND CONTROL MOTIVES: THE “WHAT” AND “HOW”
OF APPROACH AND AVOIDANCE
While the distinction between prevention vs. promotion goals is
critical for advancing our understanding of how the approach
and avoidance systems work, it is also important to examine
what approach/avoidance presupposes. The study of humans
and other animals tends to be motivated by the question of
why people and animals behave the way they do, and approach
and avoidance motives (further distinguished by promotion and
prevention goals) address this by providing an answer (value
from having desired results). But asking “why” of an action
presupposes two additional things: it assumes that the action
is bringing something about, and it assumes that the action
is motivated by some understanding that the animal has of
itself and its relation to its environment. The “bringing some-
thing about” (or managing to have an effect) constitutes the
“how” of the behavior—control motivation. The understanding
(or establishing what’s real) constitutes the “what” of behavior—
truth motivation. Both control and truth need to be success-
ful in order for the “why” to be successful. That is, control
and truth need to work together with value for effective goal
pursuit (Higgins, 2012). As such, it is not enough to con-
sider approach/avoidance value alone, even when the promo-
tion/prevention distinction is included in this consideration.
In order to demonstrate the fundamental nature and inde-
pendence of truth and control in goal pursuit, we will once
again examine them in the context of the same two domains—
motivation in non-human animals and moral motivation in
humans.
TRUTH AND CONTROL IN NON-HUMAN ANIMALS
Non-human animals do indeed approach valued end-states and
avoid aversive end-states, but in order to effectively do so, theyneed
to learn the contingencies of those end-states and actively adapt to
their environment so that those ends might be achieved. That is,
animals need to understand the contingencies and characteristics
of their environments (truth) and take an active part in manag-
ing that environment (control) in order to bring about valued
outcomes like security (prevention) and growth (promotion).
First, the “what” question is aimed at discovering the relevant
ways in which the world works. Answering this question requires
exploration and learning, both of which have been observed in
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non-human animals, even when no valued outcome is present
or attainable from them (Franks and Higgins, 2012). One of the
earliest researchers to document observations of this tendency in
non-human animals was Harlow (1950) who presented a group of
rhesus macaques with a complex mechanical puzzle. The monkeys
engaged with the puzzle in order to understand how it worked, in
spite of the fact that they received no reward for doing so—in
fact, adding a food reward to the task tended to disrupt learning
rather than facilitate it (Harlow et al., 1950). This study suggested
that the “what” question is inherently motivating independent of
“why” valued outcomes. More recently, animal welfare scientists
have shown that animals are motivated to explore and learn—
aspects of the “what” question and truth motivation in general.
For example, rats will give up known reward and incur risk in
order to explore novel environments (Franks et al., 2013a) and
goats will interact with a learning device in order to obtain sips
of water, even when water is available through less arduous means
(Langbein et al., 2009).
Furthermore, we can see how this “what” question is essen-
tial to the example involving individual differences in cotton-
top tamarins’ promotion and prevention focus described earlier
(Franks et al., 2013b). As mentioned above, different animals
were motivated to approach different stimuli in their environ-
ment with different response latencies depending on whether
they were more motivated to approach security or approach
gains. However, the example also involved the ability to dis-
criminate between “gain” and “non-gain” stimuli, presupposing
the motivation to learn that distinction. The monkeys were
able to classify the stimuli as belonging to a particular self-
regulatory category in order for them to respond to it in accor-
dance with their regulatory focus orientation. Put another way,
their ability to assess the “what” of the stimuli enabled their
action in accordance with their preferred “why” (i.e., valued
outcomes).
Second, animals also need to answer the “how”question—how
to control or manage the situation in order to actually achieve
the valued promotion or prevention, approach or avoidance goal.
Animal welfare science has been instrumental in showing that the
control or management activities themselves, such as the act of
building a nest or pushing a lever to obtain food, are motivating
independent of the actual result achieved. For example,Carder and
Berkowitz (1970) describe the case of rats who could effortlessly
attain food from a free food dish in front of them, but instead push
the food dish out of theway in order to press a lever tomake a pellet
of the same food fall into the food tray (for a general reviewof“con-
trafreeloading,” see Osborne, 1977). In other words, beyond the
desire to simply have good outcomes and the absence of bad out-
comes, animals are alsomotivated to take an active part in bringing
about these valuable results, even when doing so unnecessarily
expends energy or involves risks (Franks and Higgins, 2012).
This control motivation is also apparent in the example involv-
ing the promotion-focused and prevention-focused rats cited in
the previous section, particularly in the case of the prevention-
focused rats (Franks et al., 2012). As mentioned above, some of
the rats in the study were prevention-focused in the sense that
they focused their energy on safety through maintaining darkness.
When an aversive stimulus was placed within their environment,
however, these same prevention rats were also the most approach-
oriented. In contrast to the interpretation based on the theoretical
construct of approach/avoidance, in which animals are motivated
to minimize pain and maximize pleasure, some of the rats in this
experiment are actually intensifying an avoidable aversive experi-
ence (Franks et al., 2012). Oneway of making sense of this seeming
inconsistency is to posit a distinct motivation to act upon the
environment independent of immediate pleasurable or aversive
experiences. Thus the rats in the experiment not only established
the “what” of the stimulus (i.e., classify it as a threat), they were
also motivated to act upon the environment, to take control of the
situation, despite immediate costs. Put another way, their willing-
ness to “pay” for managing their environment suggests the worth
they placed on control, on the “how” of approach/avoidance.
The desire to achieve this “how”or control motivation has been
observed in a number of instances involving non-human animals
(for a more extensive review, see Franks and Higgins, 2012). For
example, monkeys have been found to forgo the opportunity to
receive their favorite treat in order to be able to choose from a
variety of foods, many of which they dislike (Addessi et al., 2010).
This trade-off suggests that having greater choice, and thus greater
opportunity to manage the environment, is more motivating to
the monkeys than a favorite outcome. Similarly, animal welfare
scientists have long recognized that animals often prefer to engage
in the activities that lead to desirable goals over simply receiving
the goal without having the opportunity to manage the means by
which it is achieved (Fraser and Nicol, 2011).
Interestingly, the motivation to actively manage one’s envi-
ronment has recently been posited as an important individual
difference among chimpanzees. Analyses revealed that those ani-
mals who engage in the most task-switching—those animals who
make the most active changes in managing the environment—are
also the same individuals who engage in the most reconciliatory
behavior following conﬂicts, a behavior that involves a great deal
of monitoring and control (Webb et al., 2014). Thus the “how”
motivation (control) is not only an integral and basic part of
approach/avoidance goal pursuit, it is an independent motivation
deserving of study in its own right.
These examples show that approaching desired end-states and
avoiding undesired end-states presuppose that the individual
understands its environment (truth) and is motivated to engage in
the actions that bring about the goal (control). To provide evidence
of their distinct importance, we have highlighted cases where these
truth and control motivations can be observed independent of
value motivations, but we appreciate that these cases are atypical.
More often, truth and controlmotivations integratewith approach
and avoidancemotivations to create an effectivewhole—a topicwe
will discuss inmore detail below. But, notably, in these typical cases
it is still not approach and avoidance goals working alone. Rather,
they are working together with, and depend on, the truth and
control motivations. The presence of these distinct motivations in
non-human animals points to their fundamental importance.
TRUTH AND CONTROL IN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY
In the recent modern era, valued outcomes have been argued to
be the most fundamental feature of human motivation, and there-
fore what systems of ethics should concern themselves with most
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(e.g., Bentham, 1789/2007; Harris, 2010). However, this emphasis
on outcomes appears to be an historical and cultural aberration.
For example, Aristotle (2009) writes that happiness is constituted
by a life of virtue in his Nicomachean Ethics, where contem-
plation (truth) is of paramount importance. Jesus of Nazareth
admonishes us to put the “Kingdom of God” and God’s “righ-
teousness” prior to the acquisition of worldly possessions in
the Gospel of Matthew (Thomas, 1997). The Buddha remarks
that the essential qualities for a noble individual to attain are
ethics and wisdom, explicitly setting aside things like high birth
and wealth (Walshe, 1995). These thinkers and religious leaders
tend to argue that ethics is bound up with motives other than
value.
The Buddha’s exhortation is particularly instructive in terms
of which capacities he treats as ultimately noble: wisdom and
ethics. “Wisdom” in this and related cases among ancient philoso-
phers and religious thinkers is generally understood as a virtue
like prudence, “good sense,” or the ability to see and know how to
respond to situations as they really are (i.e., truth; e.g., Aristotle,
2009). “Ethics,” as it was understood by the Buddha and other
these ancient thinkers, involves control over the self in order that
the right actions are carried out effectively in the face of tempta-
tions like selﬁshness, fear, or self-indulgence. The resulting virtues
make up the means by which an individual establishes what is real
(truth) andmanages what happens (control); frequently separated
into “intellectual” and “moral” virtues, respectively (e.g., Aquinas,
1981/1274).
Thus, many systems of ethics see the settling on the correct
courses of action and the controlled training of one’s desires to
be in line with those courses as more fundamental to becoming a
good person than designing ethical systems to maximize valued
outcomes. Questions of “what” and “how” matter critically for
questions of morality. But this theoretical foundation does not
exist only within philosophy and religion. By relating research on
motivation to research in moral psychology, we can ﬁnd empirical
evidence for the conclusion that these two motives—truth and
control—are fundamental to ethics.
Oneof the earliest questionspsychologists asked aboutmorality
is how children come to understand what is right and what is
wrong (Piaget, 1932/2008). It is not enough, for example, for pain
to be aversive; children need to learn that pain is bad or wrong, and
that causing it (to others and to the self) without good reason is
immoral. In other words, children need to learn that actions and
consequences can be right or wrong, good or bad, independent
of mere subjective experience. Moral beliefs have an “objectivity”
above subjective judgments like taste (Goodwin andDarley, 2008).
How is this objectivity achieved?
One psychological mechanism that may shed light on the
question of how moral understanding moves from subjective to
objective is shared reality. According to the theory of shared reality
(Hardin and Higgins, 1996; Echterhoff et al., 2009), human beings
achieve a sense of objectivity from their subjective states when they
perceive them as veriﬁed or shared by a trusted other. With respect
to morality, human children observe the reactions of their parents
toward particular behaviors, and toward statements about ethi-
cal truths, and then emulate within themselves (i.e., share) what
they infer to be the perceived inner states (e.g., feelings, beliefs,
goals) that underlie those reactions. In a sense, this formulation
is an extension of observational learning (Bandura, 1977), but
with shared reality it is the inner states that are imitated rather
than just the observable behaviors. This is much like the “meta-
motivational” self-regulatory factor in achievement motivation,
where individuals not only adopt the cognitions appropriate for
achievement, but the goals (in our parlance, the “right” value
motives) as well (Boekaerts, 1997).
Consider the following research with undergraduate partici-
pants for an example of how this process plays out regarding
moral beliefs. In a recent study based on Asch’s (1956) classic
experiment on the effects of social inﬂuence on perception, par-
ticipants adjusted their moral judgments to be in accord with
those around them. In the study, participants were presented
with ten moral and amoral behaviors (e.g., murder; telling a
friend she doesn’t look fat even though it’s a lie) and asked to
declare them either “morally acceptable” or “morally unaccept-
able.”Togetherwith the participantswere four other“participants”
who were actually confederates. These confederates were given
directions to provide the “right” judgment on some trials and
the “wrong” judgment on the “critical” trials that tested whether
the participants would be inﬂuenced by the confederates to
give the “wrong” judgment (i.e., moral judgments opposite to
those determined to be the nearly unanimous—at least 97%
agreement—private judgments in a pilot study; see Jago et al.,
2014). On the “critical” trials in the main study, participants
were signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced to agree with the “wrong” judg-
ment that was made by the confederates compared to responses in
non-critical trials.
Importantly, these effects appear to be related to the epistemic
characteristics of the behaviors in question. For example, one of
thebehaviorswas“murder,”andparticipants rated the judgment of
that behavior as being relatively more “obvious” as being “morally
unacceptable” than some of the other scenarios. A good example
of a less obvious case of being “morally unacceptable” was one in
which a friend tells another that she does not look fat in a pair of
jeans even though she does. This scenario is morally ambiguous
because, on the one hand, participants could argue that people
should value honesty above anything else, and tell the truth even
when it hurts a friend’s feelings, but, on the other hand, people are
often expected to set the truth aside in order to preserve the feelings
of their friends. Thus, it is not surprising that the murder scenario
was rated as more morally “obvious” than the lying scenario.
Interestingly for our purposes, if participants are, in fact, moti-
vated to come to the correct judgment of the behaviors (truth), they
should be more inﬂuenced by the unanimous majority opinion
when those behaviors are less “obvious” because of greater uncer-
tainty about what is the truth. Consistent with this prediction, the
likelihoodof providing judgments that agreedwith the unanimous
majority on “critical” trials signiﬁcantly increased as the rated
“obviousness” of the moral behaviors decreased. That is, it was
whenbehaviorsweremoremorally ambiguous or unclear that par-
ticipants were more willing to adopt the views of the unanimous
majority. They did not simply“go along to get along”or theywould
have been inﬂuenced on all of the“critical” trials equally regardless
of how“obvious” the case was. Finally, there was also evidence that
when the participants subsequently made private judgments they
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not only maintained their group-inﬂuenced judgments, but also
provided rational justiﬁcations for their judgments, which is con-
sistent with their continuing in private to believe that they adopted
as the truth. These ﬁndings support the conclusion that there is an
independent motivation to arrive at the moral truth and shared
reality is one way to achieve this.
Although establishing what is real is essential in goal pursuit,
it is not enough by itself. Individuals are also motivated to act—
to take control—in accordance with their moral beliefs and, in
doing so, determine the “how” of approaching moral rights and
avoiding moral wrongs. The classic traditions cited earlier, as well
as many contemporary moral psychologists, see moral motiva-
tion as providing a push or a pull to go beyond basic self-interest,
beyond immediate pleasure or pain (Mansbridge, 1990). Through
this lens of morality, the motivation to fulﬁll self-interest needs
to be controlled in order to accomplish the actualization of moral
behavior. For example, to be courageous in a threatening situa-
tion, an individual must control the self-interested desire to avoid
pain. To be generous, an individual may need to control the self-
interested desire to approach a personal pleasure and instead give
her money away. In fact, research has shown that when one does
not perceive oneself as responsible for (i.e., having control over)
one’s own behavior, immoral behavior becomes more likely (Vohs
and Schooler, 2008).
The non-human example of the rats responding to a noxious
stimulus above contains a parallel—enduring an aversive stim-
ulus in the short term in order to approach security. Human
beings accomplish this motivational constraint on a grander scale
through a sense of becoming (Higgins, 2005). Human beings
are capable of seeing their singular actions or inactions, their
approaches and avoidances, as instantiations of a larger long-term
project of either moral maintenance or moral growth. In this way,
human beings are able to actively act or inhibit their behavior in
order to close the gap or maintain the concordance between their
actual selves and their ideal- or ought-selves (Higgins, 2005). It is
in this way that “what” you are approaching in morality or “why”
you are approaching it are only part of the question—“how” you
approach it matters critically as well. Morality needs to be pursued
across time—sometimes a long time—and matching that con-
trolled achievement to particular goals is a key to successful“ethical
becoming.” A common maxim for this everyday phenomenon is,
“Life is a journey, not a destination.”
Evidence for control motivation is evident across psychology,
from self-determination theory (Deci, 1980; Deci and Ryan, 1985)
to self-efﬁcacy theory (Bandura, 1982, 1997). With respect to
moral psychology, let’s consider an example of the importance
of “how” you do something in a study on charitable giving. Par-
ticipants were provided with a prompt to go about their decision
making in a particular way: either in a way that sees charitable
giving as being related to fulﬁlling an ought duty, a goal that must
be vigilantly maintained across time; or as being related to an
ideal aspiration of virtue, a goal that must be eagerly attained
across time. For each of these ways of giving to charity, when
the way “ﬁt” participants’ particular regulatory focus—the ought
duty way ﬁtting with prevention; the ideal aspiration way ﬁtting
with promotion—there were signiﬁcantly higher levels of giving
among participants (Cornwell et al., unpublished manuscript).
This increase occurred because when the manner of actually going
about the decision-making process (the“how”) ﬁt with the partic-
ular goals of the individual (the “why”), which made the prospect
of giving charity more motivating, in accordance with regulatory
ﬁt theory (Higgins, 2000).
Emotional experiences also provide feedback onhowwell one is
managing one’s relation to promotion and prevention goals across
multiple situations (Higgins, 2001)—not just “how do I achieve
my goal?” but “how am I doing?” This experience also provides
a basis for control. For example, if someone fails to maintain
a basic moral standard regarding a duty or responsibility, he or
she may feel “guilty,” which can increase motivation to try harder
to maintain those standards. Similarly, if someone succeeds at
fulﬁlling an ideal moral standard regarding an aspiration, he or
she may feel“virtuous,”which can increase motivation to continue
to strive for more excellence in the future. The former emotion,
being a negative agitation-related emotion, is a prevention focus
failure emotion. The latter emotion, being a positive cheerfulness-
related emotion, is a promotion focus success emotion (Higgins,
2001). Each of them provides speciﬁc feedback that affects future
control motivation.
Importantly, the emotions are speciﬁcally relevant to the reg-
ulatory focus in question, and track the emotional experiences
that provide for the most control. Feelings of failure are a “ﬁt”
for the prevention focus because they strengthen the vigilance
that sustains prevention, leading to greater engagement. In con-
trast, feelings of success are a “ﬁt” for the promotion focus
because they strengthen the eagerness that sustains promotion,
leading to greater engagement (Higgins, 2006). If moral emo-
tions are relevant to the “how” of approach/avoidance, i.e., are
relevant to control motivation, then we should see that moral
and immoral behavior results in those emotions that ﬁt a per-
son’s self-regulatory goals (promotion or prevention) because ﬁt
strengthens the engagement that contributes to more effective
control. If emotions are not related to control, but instead sim-
ply represent positive and negative feedback for good and bad
behavior—as a purely hedonic perspective might predict—then
the type of emotional feedback should be unrelated to regulatory
focus predominance.
These alternative perspectives were tested in another study
on charitable giving conducted by Cornwell et al. (unpublished
manuscript). Participants were again given the opportunity to
donate some of their participant earnings to charity. After their
decision, they were asked to report on their internal emotional
experiences. Those who were predominantly promotion-focused
(vs. prevention-focused) reported differences in howvirtuous they
felt (low virtue if they didn’t give; high virtue if they did). In con-
trast, thosewhoweremorepredominantly prevention-focused (vs.
promotion-focused) reported differences in how guilty they felt
(high guilt if they didn’t give; low guilt if they did). The positive or
negative emotional feedback (experienced differently depending
on which type of regulatory focus goal the participant was pur-
suing) is related to the ongoing ethical project to motivate future
action. By experiencing emotional control feedback that matches
the “why” of the moral goals, individuals are more engaged and,
thus, more able to engage effectively in control over themselves for
the sake of their moral standards.
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An interesting aspect of these studies of charitable giving is that
they not only highlight the importance of the “how” for ethical
motivation, but also suggest that the “how” and the “why” can
work together (i.e., ﬁt) to achieve the most ethical behavior, over
and above the simple additive effect of each motivational element
in isolation (Higgins, 2006). According to our model, if any of the
fundamental aspects of motivation is lacking—the “what,” “how,”
or “why”—the effectiveness of an individual’s activity, whether
it be an approach or avoidance activity, will be considerably
diminished.
EFFECTIVENESS OF MOTIVE ORGANIZATION
Each of these kinds of motivations (value, truth, and control)
can be regarded as conceptually independent of one another—
providing additional motivational grounding for approach and
avoidance motivations. Importantly, however, they also need
to work together in order that approach and avoidance behav-
iors are pursued effectively (how the different motivations
interact is illustrated in Figure 2). An implication of this
conceptualization—alluded to above—is that this interactive
process underlying approach and avoidance behavior and moti-
vation can occur more or less effectively in a particular
individual.
Tounderstand the principles behind this effectiveness of motive
organization, it may be useful here to lay out how it develops in
humans. To reveal the central importance of organization, exam-
ining the independent development of truth, control, and value
motivation in isolation is insufﬁcient. Instead, a holistic, inte-
grative perspective is required to reveal how truth, control, and
value follow a developmental progression that results in their
working together effectively. In the next section, we examine
how this development occurs in human psychology to further
highlight how motives of truth, control, and value are central to
the understanding of approach and avoidance (see also Higgins,
2012).
FIGURE 2 | How the different motivations work together to produce
effective approach and avoidance behavior. Humans and other animals
seek to understand the world as it actually is (truth), and the ways in which
it relates to and affects the world (control). They determine the goals
toward which their actions intend to move (value), which interact with the
animal’s understanding of the world (truth) and how their actions affect it
(control). When these align in a satisfactory fashion, strategic eagerness or
strategic vigilance is instigated leading to the achievement of desirable
end-states and the avoidance of undesirable end-states. The consequences
of these choices then produces feedback to the animal about whether it
understood the world correctly (truth), managed to have the effect wanted
(control), and ended up with the desired results (value). Goals are then
reevaluated in light of this feedback, and the process begins again.When all
of the motives ﬁt with one another, the activity produced will “feel right.”
DEVELOPMENT OF MOTIVES
Many developmental psychologists who have worked to integrate
Piagetian developmental models with new research in cogni-
tive psychology continue to view the transition from infancy
into childhood as involving different stages of development. A
review of these stages reveals that infants and young children
tend to emphasize truth and control effectiveness at least as
much as valued outcomes. Moreover, examining these stages in
light of similar developmental work by Erikson (1980) and Freud
(1927/2011) further argue against a simple division of motivation
into approach and avoidance.
According to Erikson (1980), human beings proceed through
different phases of “conﬂict” during which they achieve particular
capacities with which to engage with the world in an effective way.
The earliest phase, occurring between birth and 2 years of age, is
the conﬂict between trust and mistrust (the oral-sensory period),
in which children attain the ability to distinguish between reality
(i.e., truth) and fantasy with the help of their caregivers. This stage
is primarily related to the desire to understand how the world
works, and is achieved through understanding how other human
beings in their environment understand the world by sharing in
their sense of reality (Erikson, 1980). Children have some basic
outcome needs at this stage (e.g., warmth and nourishment), but
these needs are not the same as desires for particular outcome
goals, which develop much later. In many ways, the fulﬁllment
of these basic needs via caregivers serves not just to achieve the
outcome, but also to achieve relational motives, which are in many
ways connected to epistemic motives, particularly with respect to
understanding reality (Hardin and Higgins, 1996). This overall
view is consistent with Piagetian and neo-Piagetian perspectives
in which the ﬁrst developmental stage is the sensorimotor stage,
when the child learns about its truth and control relationship with
the world (Piaget, 1983).
The next phase of development for Erikson (1980) occurs
around two to 4 years of age, and is understood as the con-
ﬂict between autonomy vs. shame and doubt (the muscular-anal
period). This stage is the period in which children learn how to
control their own behavior and manipulate themselves relative to
the world (control). It is also the stage in which children are able to
mentally represent objects in their minds not immediately present
to their senses (Erikson, 1980). These changes offer children the
capacity to reﬂect on how their actions inﬂuence the world and
make it change based upon their actions. They also begin to think
about how the world might be or might become, not simply how it
is. Thus children are motivated in this stage to effectively develop
the ability to control aspects of the world within their range of
inﬂuence.
The third phase of development according to Erikson (1980)
is represented by the conﬂict between initiative and guilt
(locomotor-genital), which occurs around the ages of four and
ﬁve. It is during this stage that children begin to integrate their
desires and needs with their understanding of the world and their
abilities to act upon it. In other words, during this stage, children
begin to have mental representations of goals associated with sig-
niﬁcant others’ viewpoints on them (Erikson, 1980; Higgins, 1989,
1991). It is also worth noting that during this latter portion of
the pre-operational stage, Piaget (1983) noted the development of
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what he called intuitive thought—the phase duringwhich children
begin to ask “why?” During this phase of development (roughly
equivalent to Freud’s Oedipal stage), children also become capa-
ble of inferring the inner states of others, including what others
want the child to become (ideals and oughts). This progress is an
essential development in children’s control capacity because chil-
dren can now take into account others feelings about them, beliefs
about them, and goals for them when making choices about what
to do or not do (Higgins, 1989, 1991).
It is following this ﬁnal stage that the effectiveness in the three
motivational domains can ﬁnally be integrated into a full-ﬂedged
system of goal pursuit. At this age, children are ﬁnally able to
achieve a structural integration of the “what,” “how,” and “why”
of behavior. Importantly, this classic developmental work indi-
cates that the motive for truth and control are developmentally
foundational for a full-ﬂedged approach/avoidance goal system.
It also suggests that those individuals who are most effective at
integrating these value, truth, and control motivations to form
an integrated whole would experience the most effective approach
and avoidance. We now review some recent research in moral psy-
chology supporting this view and note the theoretical possibilities
of extending this research to animal welfare science.
ORGANIZATION OF MOTIVES IN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY
As argued above, the “what,” “how,” and “why” questions of
approach and avoidance are of fundamental importance in con-
sidering questions of right and wrong, good and bad. The
preceding developmental account suggests that the most moral
human beings would be those that have effectively organized these
motivations to ethical ends—those for whom the questions of
“what,”“how,” and“why” all ﬂow together into ethical activity. The
opinions and reasoning of philosophical and religious thinkers
converge on this matter. For them, human beings are not sim-
ply the sum total of their behaviors, but have a point of unity
about which a judgment can be made: a character or soul—in this
case, the animating principle of life (in Greek, psyche, in Latin,
anima), rather than a Cartesian “ghost in the machine.” Those in
ancient and classical traditions tend to divide the human soul into
three parts: the affective, the volitional, and the rational, typically
denoted as the affections, will, and reason, which, in turn, corre-
spond to the motivational constructs of value, control, and truth,
respectively. As early as Plato (1992), the best human soul would
be one in which the three different aspects worked together for
the good of the person (Crombie, 1962). For these thinkers, this
working together of the soul constitutes the “good life” and has
two major implications for moral psychology.
First, it suggests that that those in whom the three forms of
motivation work together would also be the most likely to engage
in behavior generally deemed to be ethical. Preliminary evidence
supports this hypothesis. We have developed a scale to measure
the degree of relational integrity among the three motivations,
called the “Effectiveness of Motive Organization” scale (EMO;
Cornwell et al., unpublished manuscript). This scale correlates
not only with higher effectiveness in each of the three kinds of
motivation separately (higher measured truth, control, and value
effectiveness; Franks, 2012), but also with lower levels of variance
among the independent motives. In other words, the people who
score highest on the EMO scale also have the most integrated (i.e.,
equally high) levels of truth, control, and value effectiveness, sug-
gesting greater mutual support and the absence of a dominant or
deﬁcient motivation.
Importantly for the research on ethics, the EMO scale was cor-
related with Benevolence values over and above other values as
measured by the Schwartz Value Inventory (over and above other
values such asAchievement or Stimulation; Schwartz,1992),which
are theoretically associated with self-transcendence and altruism.
Moreover, scores on the EMO scale signiﬁcantly predicted the
likelihood that an individual will engage in charitable giving in
the 4 weeks after measurement, the frequency of self-reported
altruistic behaviors, and the likelihoodof helping in an experimen-
tally created ambiguous situation (Cornwell et al., unpublished
manuscript).
The second implication stemming from the link between the
“good life” and an effective motive organization is that the most
effectivemeans bywhich to achieve this integration of motivations
should occur at the person level rather than the behavioral level—
that is, at the level of moral character rather than moral behavior.
An implication of the earlier point regarding the development
and integration of the three forms of motivation is that all of
the motivations are implicated in every behavior an individual
engages in or inhibits. Thus, a person’s moral character (i.e., how
likely he or she is to engage in moral behavior or inhibit immoral
behavior) may be directly related to the integrity of his or her
motives. This level of analysis most fruitfully occurs at the level
of the individual as a whole, rather than the particulars of any
given behavior. Notably, the word “integrity” itself refers both
to having united (integrated) characteristics and a strong moral
character.
In the moral psychology literature, there is growing evidence
that the construct of moral character is of paramount importance,
even though early attempts by trait theorists to measure it empir-
ically were largely regarded as failures (Hartshorne et al., 1930).
Researchers have theorized that incorporating judgments of char-
acter into our theories of moral judgment would greatly improve
their predictive capacity and perhaps help us to understand other-
wise puzzling judgments and behavior (Pizarro and Tannenbaum,
2011). Empirical work on the subject has also shown that when
making judgments, individuals often judge whether a behavior is
the sort of thing a good personwould do rather than simply judging it
according to its negative consequences or conformity to universal
rules or norms (Inbar et al., 2011). Furthermore, recent work has
shown that judgments of moral character actually predominate
over other important dimensions of social judgment (Goodwin
et al., 2014). Research has also demonstrated the importance of
virtues and character strengths in understanding behavior and
success (Peterson and Seligman, 2004). Finally, research has shown
that encouraging moral behavior among young children is most
effective when their character is commended for performing a par-
ticular altruistic behavior as opposed to rewarding them (Grusec
and Redler, 1980).
These last results are of particular interest given the earlier
developmental account. They suggest that it is only after the devel-
opment of each of the independent motivations (truth, control,
and value) and their integration into a relational whole can a
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truly “moral” human being come about. In light of this formu-
lation, it is interesting to note that Freud (1927/2011) himself
argued that the developmental stage immediately following the
locomotor-genital stage (after which each of the three motives
is present) is that in which conscience develops. The empirical
research cited above on the advantage of praising moral char-
acter (vs. rewarding moral behavior) shows that praise during
an earlier stage of development is ineffective. The study found
that among 5-year-olds, subsequent behavior did not differ as a
function of whether their character was praised for their altruistic
behavior or they were rewarded for it. However, among 8-year-
olds, praising the character of children did increase subsequent
altruism, whereas reward did not. This difference in the efﬁcacy of
character praise vs. reward is consistent with the view that moral
character presupposes the ability to organize these motivations
in an effective way—children did not respond to praise until age
8, which is after the proposed developmental account above is
complete (Grusec and Redler, 1980).
Thus we see how the three kinds of fundamental motivations
and their effective organization are critically important for inves-
tigating the domain of ethics. Given the centrality of this domain
to the lives of so many people, its fundamental nature is apparent.
Yet it remains to be seen whether the organization of these differ-
ent motives is important for non-human animals as well. In the
ﬁnal section, we discuss some of the research suggesting that this
question should be answered in the afﬁrmative.
ORGANIZATION OF MOTIVES IN NON-HUMAN ANIMALS
Though there is a strong philosophical foundation for linking the
three forms of motivations and their effective organization to the
discipline of ethics, the relation to non-human animals is not
as obvious. Non-human animals may have certain characteristics
that cause them to behave in ways that we might understand as a
kind of precursor to the comprehensive ethical systems found in
humans (e.g., Flack and De Waal, 2000). Nevertheless, they may
not have certain fundamentally human capacities of conscious-
ness nor take into account the inner states of others the way that
humans do (Higgins, 2005), and thus they would not organize
themselves according to morality in the same manner. However,
by adopting the idea of the “soul” as an integrative animating
principle rather than a “rational” ghost in the machine, the same
principle could be applied to non-human animals. Indeed, many
pre-Enlightenment thinkers, though acknowledging the different
capacities of human beings relative to other animal species, nev-
ertheless attribute souls to non-human animals (e.g., Aristotle,
1986). Thus, if the three motivations have measurable outcomes
in humans in the domain of ethics, there may be analogous
outcomes for an effective motive organization in non-human
animals.
The area in which this concept may be of particular interest
is in the ﬁeld of animal welfare science. In addition to moral
values and behaviors, the EMO scale is also highly correlated
to various measures of well-being (Cornwell et al., unpublished
manuscript), such as life satisfaction (Diener et al., 1985) and the
perception of one’s life as meaningful (Baumeister et al., 2013).
These two relations closely mirror“pleasure”and“meaning” in the
pleasure-meaning-engagement triadof humanhappiness outlined
by Peterson et al. (2005; see also Haidt, 2006), and there is other
evidence that the EMO scale is related to engagement as well.
Thus, the “good life” may be “good” in two senses: “good” as
being morally good and “good” as being well. Since the latter
form of “good” is something that human and non-human animals
share,we predict that those animalswith themost effectivemotives
organization are the ones that have the best welfare. Indeed, this
hypothesis was already implicated in our theoretical exploration
of each of thesemotivations in the context of non-human animals.
While no research to date has directly tackled the question of
how motive organization relates to welfare, there are several lines
of evidence pointing to the utility of this framework (Franks and
Higgins, 2012). For this reason, we believe it could be productive
to pursue it as a model for future welfare research. For exam-
ple, the motivation for food—a valuable outcome—is certainly a
hallmark of good welfare: loss of appetite is a strong indicator of
illness and poor welfare. Nevertheless, an unchecked motivation
for food can also be a sign of poor welfare (D’Eath et al., 2009). An
individual who is so preoccupied with food (unrestrained value
motivation) that it loses interest in changes to its surroundings
(diminished truth motivation) or loses the motivation to engage
in species-typical activities (diminished control motivation) has
a poor organization of motives and is likely to suffer from poor
welfare. Similarly, individual animals subjected to learned help-
lessness experiment conditions learn that they have no control
over the outcomes in their life (Maier and Seligman, 1976), which
reﬂects a disorganization of motives that coincides with poor wel-
fare. Thus, we see preliminary evidence that, as in the domain of
moral psychology, the relative effectiveness of the three fundamen-
tal forms of motivation could potentially be of critical importance
to research among non-human animals as well. As we believe that
developing these ideas and testing them across species is an impor-
tant line of inquiry, we hope to see more research in animal welfare
science examining the utility of this framework.
FINAL COMMENTS
Throughout this paper we have argued that the study of approach
and avoidance motivation may beneﬁt from the incorpora-
tion of additional perspectives on what other motivations it
needs to work with (truth and control motivation) and how,
as a value motivation, it can be further differentiated (pro-
motion approach/avoidance vs. prevention approach/avoidance).
We have discussed three independent motivations that are pre-
supposed by approach/avoidance: namely truth (the “what” of
approach/avoidance), control (the “how”of approach/avoidance),
and value (the“why”of approach/avoidance), andwe have empha-
sized the importance of considering how they work together.
We have provided evidence for our perspective by examining
these motivational constructs in human moral psychology and
non-human animal welfare science. In so doing, we have noted
phenomena with which a purely hedonic approach cannot grap-
ple. We concluded by noting that the organization of these three
kinds of motives may be of central importance to the larger story
of approach/avoidance.
For both moral psychology and animal welfare science, atten-
tion to the integrity of motives would involve regarding the
individual as a whole at the appropriate level of analysis to strive
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for a complete understanding of how integrity relates to different
kinds of effectiveness (moral character for humans and well-
being for all animals). This framework is a reconceptualization of
motivation that goes beyond the hedonic principle to extend our
ability to address the full complexity of human and non-human
behavior.
The hedonic principle that animals approach pleasure and
avoid pain has provided scientists with substantial explanatory
and predictive power. In recent years, however, some of its limita-
tions as a “one size ﬁts all” distinction have become apparent. In
this paper, we have discussed the ways that new developments in
motivation science have contributed to the growth of the ﬁelds of
moral psychology and animal welfare science, and the contribu-
tions extend beyond these two alone. Understanding the nature
of motivation is essential for understanding humans and other
animals, and it is critical that this understanding be equipped to
answer the fundamental questions of “what,” “how,” and “why”
when it comes to approach and avoidance.
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